The community development movement in America was shaped initially by the adoption of the community development corporation (CDC) model, by some of the largest of the nation's private philanthropies as an answer to the numerous and intermingled problems of the nation's burgeoning "urban crisis." The choice of this kind of a community-based institution to grapple with the problems of economically distressed, and frequently minority, communities, however appropriate and successful initially, had far-reaching and long-term consequences for the American community development, and the community development fi nancial institution (CDFI), movement. This was a kind of decision that economists and historians frequently describe as a critical juncture in a path-dependent process, in this case, the creation and sustenance of the American community development movement. The adoption of the CDC model was a choice that "locked in" a set of programmatic choices that shape not only the way in which activities were managed by these neighborhood organizations originally but also the choices available for community development from that point forward.
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Such critical choices involve not only creating institutions to fulfi ll the objectives of a social movement (in this case the CDC model of neighborhood development) but also establishing relationships with other institutions (especially philanthropy and government) that provide sustenance to this movement. Especially important among these relationships is the manner in which resources and benefi ts fl ow between institutions that permit activities that allow agencies, businesses, and other organizations within this institutional matrix to access, expend, and accumulate abilities and resources. The adoption of the CDC model of community development brings with it incentives to act in certain ways (e.g., to engage in business-friendly and brick-and-mortar investments) while precluding other, more expansive or transformative activities. The decision to establish and lavishly fi nance CDCs both established the CDC model as the primary mode to engage in community economic and housing development and tended to exclude other kinds of strategies. These choices established a web of institutions and relationships among public and philanthropic agencies within the community development system.
Once fi xed and stable, it becomes diffi cult and costly to adopt different institutional arrangements, strategies or programs. Examples abound throughout economic history of path-dependent development. Some of the most famous examples come from economic history. The QWERTY arrangement of keys on a typewriter as opposed to the keyboard design patented by August Dvorak and W.L. Dealey; video home system (VHS) versus Betamax taping systems; railways over canals for the shipment of goods; or, the use of alternating versus direct current for the transmission of electricity. In each case, the choice of one technology over another was contingent yet shaped subsequent development not on the basis of clearly superior ideas or technique but because, once a critical step in development is made, an expensive institutional framework is created and substantial resources are expended to sustain and expand this choice. A choice of one path of development, a collective decision that chooses one of perhaps many alternatives, shapes, attracts, and retains investment in this social and economic commitment, building the infrastructural framework and a set of relationships among institutions across society to allow the development of these choices. Not only does this create a set of positive and profitable benefi ts to increasingly dominant economic interests (and indeed frequently widespread benefi ts for consumers and citizens), but also any alternative becomes extremely expensive and destructive to those institutions that have been developed to sustain this path of economic growth.
Policy choices frequently take on very similar characteristics. Probably the best-known example from recent American history is decisions made as a result of corporate-labor negotiations, aided signifi cantly by the structure of the American tax code, to provide what were believed to be non-monetary health-care benefi ts (health insurance) to employees as a means to maintain labor peace and assure high productivity in the industrial sector in the immediate post-Second World War period. This choice was attractive to both corporations and unions because it was private and mediated through marketplaces and these benefi ts could be modifi ed as a result of negotiations between private businesses and their unions (or alternatively with individual employees) and thus ostensibly be attuned to the precise (and frequently differing) needs of various sectors of the American economy and, because corporations could use tax credits, push the costs onto the public sector. Acquiring health care through one's employer became the mode in which millions of workers acquired this increasingly important benefi t. Beginning in the late 1940s, this health-care choice helped create dozens of health insurance companies, the new economic entities required to fulfi ll these benefi ts to employees. Health insurance companies, in turn, developed relationships with health-care providers, both hospitals and groups of physicians, creating an entire health-care industry that dealt in millions of claims and processed billions of dollars of payments annually, eventually growing to one of the largest sectors of the US economy. Institutions and individuals adapt behaviors and make investments in response to choices previously adopted, especially if they are enshrined, as they often are, in law. Such adaptations make it prohibitively costly to change these institutions, laws, or the activities of markets through which investments and exchanges are made, and because of this (the earlier, contingent social decision), they become the basis of permanent structures in our society. 3 The range of strategies, programs, and choices available to institutions-the state, markets, and indeed community-based organizations-is profoundly shaped by previous choices. This is, of course, a statement that "history matters," but it is also appropriate to apply this to the American community development movement. What was important for the CDFI industry was the creation of its predecessor, the CDC model. The CDC model was created and imposed upon distressed communities by private (distinctly non-governmental) philanthropies, who were willing to use their deep pockets to provide high levels of resources through their grant making to create and sustain these community development institutions for long periods of time. This "choice" shaped the trajectory of the CDFI industry, enhancing the "bricks and mortar" and fi nancial opportunities of community development, but just as importantly, precluding other strategies and programs that would have created other answers to the many problems facing what Michael Harrington had characterized as "The Other America."
A FRAMEWORK OF THE CONTEMPORARY CDFI MOVEMENT
The institutional structure and direction of the contemporary community development movement have been shaped by a history that began, as we have already noted, with the actions taken not by government but by the nation's philanthropic community. Today's CDFI industry was infl uenced by decisions framed to address a set of increasingly serious and palpable problems coming to the fore some 60 years ago, especially in the nation's large metropolitan areas. Uneven economic and housing development that undermined the dominance of central cities, along with starkly unequal housing development, occurred at the same time as (and in large part contributed to) dramatic demographic changes swamped cities and their suburban neighbors alike. 4 This confi guration of problems came to be known as America's "urban crisis," a crisis that was nonetheless obscured by what many policy elites, and certainly the American public, saw as the postwar economic miracle. Observant academic analysts, especially sociologists, however, guided, in no small way, by the funding largess of large national foundations, the Ford Foundation preeminently, noted with some alarm that this "urban crisis" was a new phenomenon that wrapped together intractable problems-especially sustained, structural racial inequality-which were not only unlikely to be solved by the expansion of national economy but in fact would be exacerbated by it, perhaps so seriously as to threaten the basic fabric of social order in the nation's cities, if not American society writ large. 5 American central cities 70 years ago, it is important to recall, housed a very high proportion of metropolitan areas' population, economic activities, and housing (albeit if much of these housing units were obsolete and a signifi cant proportion substandard). 6 Additionally, the nation's cities were home to nearly all major institutions in American society, especially fi nance, corporate headquarters, a host of businesses providing services to these corporate centers, education (particularly universities), medical complexes, and administrative offi ce centers of government. Large cities, where such a high proportion of economic and administrative resources were concentrated, were threatened by the strong decentralizing forces of economic and housing development that consistently benefi ted new outlying suburban areas at the expense of cities.
7 America's philanthropic institutions became more and more aware that the interests of nearly all the major institutions of cities were becoming increasingly undermined by the prevailing decentralizing forces of contemporary American development. Additionally, the American philanthropic community came to understand that the intractable problems of what Gunnar Myrdal had only a decade before vividly described as the American Dilemma were, because of the stunning demographic changes in the American space economy, moving from the American South to the cities of the urban North and West. Bluntly, the second Great Migration of African-Americans from the rural South to the metropolitan areas of the country, where black Americans were channeled into central cities, and indeed, into the worst areas of American central cities, represented a historically unprecedented and potentially explosive matrix of social, economic, and political problems. took little imagination (and Ford Foundation funding encouraged many of the nation's most talented sociologists and psychologists to speculate expansively) to think of the consequences of the presence of a very large, growing, unassimilated, poorly educated, newly urbanized non-white population permanently forced to live in overcrowded and dreadfully substandard housing with few, if any, prospects of employment or economic advance. Central cities in America and many of their neighborhoods could easily become cauldrons of social dysfunction and unrest, in and around the sites of critical business centers, universities, hospitals, and administrative offi ces of public agencies. The urban crisis and the racial inequities of American society converged in the nation's cities, a fact that was hardly lost on the largest philanthropies, religious organizations, and academics in the USA in the immediate postwar era.
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Prompted to action and led by the Ford Foundation, an initial programmatic solution posed to deal with the multifaceted problems of the urban crisis has had especially long-lasting consequences for the American community development. This-the font for the American community development movement-was the decision by the Ford Foundation to create and lavishly fund the CDC model as the solution addressing poor, impoverished, and economically distressed urban and rural communities. The importance of the creation and wholesale adoption of the CDC model as the basis of the American community development movement can hardly be overstated. This CDC model enabled and encouraged a specifi c set of programs and strategies for distressed communities and in fact brought about many benefi ts to such communities, yet also precluded other systemic approaches to deal with poverty, underdevelopment, and racial strife, the results of which still persist to the present.
CDCs were private (albeit non-profi t) answers to the challenges of the economic backwaters of the American economy; they were business organizations and/or business-friendly organizations that were utterly dependent upon philanthropic resources. CDCs engaged in brick-and-mortar projects to improve the housing stock of poor neighborhoods and assisted in commercial real estate projects as well as in business lending. Building and managing housing complexes and business centers seemed as the solution to the problems of economic decline, employment, and poor housing which plagued impoverished and declining communities. Such brick-andmortar strategies represented the limits of community action as supported and liberally fi nanced by philanthropies and religious organizations.
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The CDC/CDFI model, premised upon a strategy initiated by American philanthropies, established a movement that, while providing real, tangible, and, at times, extraordinary benefi ts to some of the nation's poorest communities, was one that was minimalist and incapable of fundamentally changing the basic features of the uneven distribution of economic or social benefi ts, or of the overriding and still-all-too-present problem of racial inequality. CDCs were not political organizations nor designed (or well-suited) to act as the political agents of an unassimilated and economically alienated population. CDCs were created, intentionally or not, to mediate and channel potential sources of discontent and/or social unrest. They worked in brick and mortar, focusing on housing and commercial real estate development. As a model of social change, the CDC model directed activities into a narrow range (of activities) and limited demands on an entrenched patronage (although rapidly weakening)-based system of local public administration.
11 Importantly, CDCs were especially ill-suited to deal with issues of racial inequality or, indeed, to deal with the dramatic population changes central cities were undergoing in the post-Second World War era. CDCs accepted wholly the long-standing and historically entrenched geographic fragmentation of individual "neighborhoods" that were defi ned by their social and ethnic cohesion. 12 The CDC model, infl uenced as it was by a small army of University of Chicago-trained sociologists, adopted Park and Burgess' vision of the American city as little distinct worlds of fragmented ethnic enclaves that "touch but do not interpenetrate." The CDC model embraced the all-too-typical American system of geographic fragmentation, and in so doing, reinforced what some historians see as one of the fundamental mechanisms where social 10 David Erickson, The Housing Policy Revolution , 36-40. 11 Randy Stoecker, "The Community Development Corporation Model of Urban Redevelopment: A Political Economy Critique and an Alternative" accessed at http:// comm-org.wis.edu/papers96/cdc.html .
12 O'Connor, "Community Action," notes that Paul Ylvisaker, the economist who headed the Gray Areas program at the Ford Foundation, had a nuanced and sensitive understanding of American race relations but also understood that any project he proposed had to appear to steer clear of the question of race. See p. 607.
peace is maintained over a strikingly diverse ethnic (and racial) American population by maintaining social and spatial separation. Spatial separation of differing groups as solutions to potential strive predates the founding of the American republic. As early as America's Puritan period when stark religious differences threatened to tear the Massachusetts colony apart, the splinter group of dissidents literally moved from Boston to locate another community in Rhode Island. Social peace was maintained via literal spatial separation. This was repeated albeit in different forms throughout early American history, especially so when America became home to waves of immigrants in the post-Civil War era.
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The experience of the Great Society's, especially the apparent wholesale adoption of the nascent CDC model explicitly by the War on Poverty program with the added mandate of "maximum feasible participation," was apparently disastrous for the nation's community development movement. In part, this was because federal policy, if for a brief period, expanded the basic CDC model to explicitly include a political agenda, especially the wholesale challenge to entrenched systems of local public administrative agencies responsible for delivering basic public services. This discrediting of community activism easily provided the new conservative Nixon administration ample justifi cation to dismantle an array of Great Society programs, including specifi cally those community development initiatives that were so offensive to the nation's big-city mayors as well as state officials.
14 This led to a period of some two decades where most institutions involved in community economic development were denied access to any measureable degree of public fi nancial support. This long period of public disinvestment in the community development movement provided an opportunity, which some readily adopted, to provide a new and modifi ed vision of community economic development in the USA. While still enamored of the basic outlines of community development, this permitted some especially astute activists in the movement to redefi ne and expand the vision, the ideological meaning, and, indeed, the institutional framework of the nation's community development movement.
Most importantly, this permitted the elaboration and adoption of "mission" as a central tenet of the CDFI industry. A pivotal fi gure for the movement was Chuck Matthei. With a background in the same Catholic social justice organizations that Michael Harrington had worked with in Chicago, and with his relationships with civil rights activists, Matthei was instrumental in reshaping the aims of the CDFI industry. Matthei augmented the business orientation of the CDC model to the aims and ideals of social, economic, and racial justice for the CDFI movement. Nor was this Matthei's only contribution to the movement. He was also responsible for originating the idea of a "community balance sheet," in addition to the need to create and sustain permanent indigenous community-based fi nancial institutions to provide lending and fi nancial services to businesses and individuals in poor areas. Defi ning the role of CDFIs in this fashion permitted the community development movement to defi ne itself as a viable alternative to mainstream American fi nancial institutions. This allowed the CDFI movement, from the early 1970s forward, to expand to a wider range of institutions, including land trusts, community loan funds, lowincome credit unions, and community development banks.
This period witnessed the creation of an institutional framework of dozens of small fi nancial institutions that, while defi ning themselves as an alternative to mainstream fi nancial institutions, nonetheless forged relationships with these fi nancial institutions as well as with philanthropic and religious organizations during the long hiatus of federal support. CDFIs, during this period, created themselves as a long-lasting institutional framework for community economic development, a system that existed long before Bill Clinton became enamored with the community banking industry. This is especially critical: the new Clinton administration's proposal for a new system of 100 community development banks was essentially a policy non-starter. The choice for Washington policy-makers became between endorsing and providing modest support for the already existing CDFI movement and creating an entirely new and untested system of community banks, requiring substantial changes to the entire fabric of federal fi nancial institution regulation and legislation. The readily available, inexpensive, and easier policy course was to adopt and provide a federal agency to support the already tested and successful (albeit on a very small scale) CDFI industry. Doing the latter was a readily available policy path and was seen as relatively inexpensive to implement. In the end, it is easy to see why the endorsement of the CDFI industry was adopted.
The Fair Housing Act, passed very late in the Johnson administration, is quietly but extraordinarily important for American social policy, community development programs included. This Act both was a repudiation of New Deal-style program implementation and opened the way for the use of tax incentives as the primary means to achieve a range of public policy objectives. The New Deal had established programmatic precedents where, by design, citizens received benefi ts directly from a federal agency: tens of thousands were directly employed in the Works Progress Administration or the Civilian Conservation Corps, and millions had their homes refi nanced by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. Some Great Society programs emulated this direct citizen-federal agency relationships and for similar reasons. Just as Franklin D. Roosevelt was highly suspicious of the Democratic urban political machines that were imperfect supporters (at best) of New Deal programs, Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) wished to bypass the entrenched city bureaucracies of big cities and establish direct ties between minority communities and federal bureaucracies to ensure that numerically increasing minority voters would establish an allegiance to Democratic party politics. 15 LBJ's rejection of the New Deal model, at least, for housing policy in the Fair Housing Act came about, in part, because public housing projects, at that time in place for over a decade, had already shown that the hyper-segregation of minorities, especially very poor blacks and Latinos, was an especially bad solution to the housing needs of low-income families. Indeed, many public housing projects, exemplifi ed by the PruittIgoe complex in St. Louis or the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, were disastrous concentrations of extreme poverty, crime, and violence. 16 In no small way, the Fair Housing Act was designed to marshal the considerable resources and talent of the private sector through providing profi table incentives, either for new construction or for extensive rehabilitation of the standing housing stock, to not only expand the supply of housing but also dramatically enhance the opportunities for home ownership among the poor, most of whom in cities were African-American. While the Act was a consummation of the civil rights agenda of LBJ's Great Society and eliminated some of the more egregious racially discriminatory activities of the American realty industry, another important policy legacy of this signature piece of legislation was the policy switch to the reliance on private market actors to fulfi ll the objectives of national policy. 17 In so doing, the At root, the CDFI industry originated with the CDC model of community development, which came about as a result of private, philanthropic policy-making. Non-governmental entities, especially the Ford Foundation, garnered what was considered the most advanced analysis of social problems by social scientists and then, based on this compelling if fl awed narrative, made several large grants to create CDCs in large cities and some rural areas in the USA. These CDCs were designed and then lavishly funded by several large national foundations to deal with the intertwined problems of impoverished communities: poor housing, limited economic opportunities, badly performing schools, and political disenfranchisement. The CDC model, as a local, non-governmental agency, was to act primarily as a developer and then administrator of new, affordable housing and, in some cases, to facilitate commercial real estate development in poor communities. From the point of view of its philanthropic sponsors, CDCs were successful vehicles to advance the interests of the American poor population in both urban and rural settings.
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With the substantial resources provided by some of the nation's largest philanthropies, CDCs provided tangible benefi ts to minority neighborhoods in cities and economically distressed rural areas. CDCs developed new, high quality, and affordable housing, business development, and employment in communities that were both economically and politically disenfranchised. The CDC model, created independently and in part in opposition to the entrenched administrative politics, especially of local government, provided to its sponsors programs and benefi ts that served the unique needs of the nation's impoverished areas and a way to manage, albeit in a fragmented way, the potential for an unraveling of social order and cohesion in an increasingly impoverished substantial segment of the population, much of it African-American or Latino.
This CDC model as a solution to the array of problems associated with the "urban crisis," a solution that William Domhoff and others have stressed represented a restrictive and indeed co-opting strategy that, being both minimalist and overtly friendly to private business practices, represented the limits of what was an acceptable strategy at the community level for American corporate elites. 20 The CDC model typicifi ed private public policy that could be controlled by the purse strings of major foundations, managing the activities of community-based organizations into a set of acceptable activities and providing benefi ts, so their philanthropic sponsors believed, would provide suffi cient, tangible benefi ts to the nation's lower classes that would assure an acceptable level of social peace. Barring any further interventions into community development in America, the CDC model would have likely represented the limits of neighborhood development in poor communities in American central cities and distressed rural areas. The nation's foundations would have likely continued and extended funding of CDCs as their answer to the nation's urban crisis.
Such was not, however, to be the case. This CDC model was adopted by the policy-makers of the federal government's War on Poverty in the 1960s. Indeed, to the basic components of the CDC model was added, by fi at of federal legislation establishing the Offi ce of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the requirement, hardly well understood at the time by policy-makers, of "maximum feasible participation" by the residents, who were to be the benefi ciaries of the federal War on Poverty. The expansive largess of federal resources swamped that of what previously had been more or less exclusively the domain of the nation's philanthropies in funding community development efforts and, in so doing, dramatically undermined the carefully constructed capacity of the nation's foundations to control the extent and direction of programs at the local level. Community development projects under the Great Society's War on Poverty, with its mandate for "maximum feasible participation," overtly politicized the community development movement, especially in the nation's large cities. Minority communities, empowered by federal grants and charged with fulfi lling their mandate for "maximum feasible participation," openly challenged local public administrations, systems frequently organized by patronage systems manned by white ethnic personnel that previously had primarily benefi ted white communities.
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The Great Society's programs aimed at conducting the War on Poverty in the nation's urban neighborhoods did much to discredit the community development brand. The numerous perceived failures of the War on Poverty's Community Action Program came to be directly associated with community development and led to the widespread disdain across a large swath of the American ideological spectrum, of such programs. Today's CDFI movement rose from the policy ashes of the numerous, and varied, Great Society initiatives, especially those that were funded from the OEO. OEO funded many inventive, well-thought-out projects and placed substantial fi nancial resources into the hands of many institutions that were both well managed and handled their largess from the federal government prudently and responsibly. However, there were just as numerous (probably a much greater plurality) programs funded by the OEO as part of the Great Society's War on Poverty that were at best only casually thought out and haphazardly, if not sometimes, fraudulently managed. Daniel Patrick Moynihan was hardly the only contemporary critic of the swath of Great Society War on Poverty programs to point to the numerous failures of individual projects. Sergeant Shriver, who headed OEO for LBJ, not infrequently referred to some of the antipoverty proposals brought to his desk as "Dr. Strangelove" projects-no more related to the multifaceted problems facing America's poor communities than General Jack Ripper's attributions of the ubiquitous and insidious infl uence of fl uoridation undermining all that was good in American culture in Stanley Kubrick's sardonic comedy. While the Great Society programs of the federal government, including the War on Poverty, produced many long-lasting benefi ts that persist in the American polity to the presentthe Medicare and Medicaid programs, notably, public initiatives that, in measureable fashion, signifi cantly alleviated poverty as the norm among the nation's elderly-federal community development programs launched in the mid-1960s have left a distinctly uneven and indeed largely negative heritage. The perceived failure of antipoverty and community development programs created a sustained policy narrative that foreclosed direct federal intervention into the host of problems concentrated in poor, frequently minority, inner-city neighborhoods, Native American reservations, and numerous rural communities. Along with this narrative came, especially at the behest of the conservative Nixon administration, the wholesale fi scal abandonment by the federal government of nearly all community social, housing, and economic programs, de facto devolving such programs to state, county, and local governments to grapple, however effectively or poorly, with this host of problems.
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Another important infl uence, then, that shaped today's CDFI movement was the sudden shift in federal policy following the end of the Great Society, especially in terms of urban policy. Urban programs generally and locally based community economic development programs in particular suffered from the benign neglect but at times the overt hostility from a succession of Republican administrations (Nixon, Ford, and especially Reagan). Perhaps in some ways, this long period of governmental indifference was most important in shaping the character of the contemporary CDFI industry. While the lack of large, public resources from the federal government especially was hardly conducive to the growth and expansion of a movement whose explicit objective was to create channels of investment and economic growth in poor and distressed American communities, the lack of direct governmental involvement held one distinct advantage for the nascent CDFI movement. Namely, absent grants from federal or state governmental sources, resources administered by public bureaucracies that dictate their uses, reporting requirements, and a set of compliance dictates, CDFIs were permitted to establish their own identity and mission autonomously. It was during this period of public policy's benign neglect that the CDFI movement established its identity as mission-driven institutions whose objective was to act as viable substitutes for American mainstream regulated fi nancial institutions. From the demise of the many ostensible community-based development programs of the Great Society's War on Poverty in the late 1960s until the creation of the CDFI Fund in the early 1990s, the movement was offered the opportunity to create loan funds, many of them offshoots or transformations of already existing CDCs, found community land trusts (CLTs), craft non-profi t housing co-ops, and experiment with other programmatic initiatives as solutions to the ongoing problems of decent and affordable housing and programs of community economic development in some of the country's impoverished economically distressed areas. Ironically, the experience of nearly two decades without any meaningful or substantial federal support for community economic development brought a commitment to forge these small, local, mission-driven institutions to embrace, perhaps in classic American fashion, the dictates of the private marketplace.
Bluntly, this long period of public indifference (sometimes downright hostility) to the community economic development movement imposed extraordinary hardship on the many newly forming CDFIs and land trusts that were largely starved, in stark contrast to the experience of the plethora of federal resources during the War on Poverty, of easily acquired fi nancing with which to engage in lending and development activities in poor communities. Dependent upon the uneven resources provided by foundations, national and local, CDCs, CDFIs, land trusts, and lowincome credit unions were threatened repeatedly with insolvency. Into this vacuum, religious-based institutions stepped in, at critical junctures, to provide the needed fi nancial support for an array of community-based economic development institutions to survive and persist. Notably key was the intervention of an order of Catholic nuns that provided, as an element in their retirement portfolio, needed capital to many CDFIs and credit unions. these investments in the CDFI and low-income credit union industry in their hour of need, is still active in administering the investments of the Order of Adrian Dominicans and is also a persistent voice for social justice and the need for continuing community economic development in today's CDFI movement.
The experience helped forge an industry of several hundred unregulated community loan funds, a movement with an identity organized around a clear normative vision that respected fairness and equity, and required as well organizational self-reliance. In the long period of federal indifference to the host of problems concentrated in inner-city ghettos and barrios as well as numerous communities in rural America, the CDFI industry slowly and steadily, over two decades, founded numerous small independent loan funds, frequently fi nanced by religious organizations and philanthropies, creating a network of community-based loan funds, and a handful of credit unions and banks across the country committed to developing and expanding the supply of affordable housing across the country; expanding business development (frequently through, at that time, untested microbusiness loans); increasing job opportunities, especially for quality, wellpaying stable employment; and taking control over those expanses within city and across rural communities that had long since been abandoned by mainstream fi nancial institutions and, indeed, government.
The CDFI movement grew slowly in the two decades following the demise of Great Society's community development programs in the late 1960s. CDFIs during this formative period were, as today, a diverse set of institutions composed largely of community loan funds, low-income credit unions, CLTs, and a handful of community banks. CDFIs largely developed as small, locally based, unregulated fi nancial institutions-overwhelmingly community loan funds-that assumed many roles and, indeed, expanded on those CDCs that had previously developed. One important function that loan funds particularly adopted was to act as intermediaries between both conventional sources (mainstream banks, insurance companies, and pension funds) and atypical sources (philanthropic and public sources) of capital and low-income borrowers that had historically been ignored by the mainstream fi nancial institutions. Additionally, some CDFIs acted not solely as fi nancial agents per se but also as economic and housing development actors that accumulated land and developed non-profi t land or housing trusts. What distinguished the CDFI movement was the CDFI industry's defi nition of its unique "mission." As frequently noted by many leaders in the industry, the "mission" of the CDFI movement can be appropriately summarized in a quote from Martin Luther King, Jr.: "The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice." CDFIs are, in other words, committed to social and economic justice in America's most distressed communities: to confront and remedy the economic and housing development needs of impoverished populations in inner-city and rural communities that have been bypassed in the postwar economic expansion of the American economy. The CDFI movement intentionally seeks to serve what Michael Harrington had characterized as the "Other America"-communities and the millions of residents of this other America where poverty, unemployment, and poor-quality public services have festered for decades. CDFIs, during this formative period, where direct assistance from government agencies was negligible, forged an identity as locally based fi nancial institutions distinct from the mainstream banking industry, serving the investment and development needs of low-income economically distressed communities. In contrast from conventional banking, where the profi t motive and safe and secure returns on investment dictated loans and investments in their portfolios, CDFIs were motivated by a mission to improve the lives of the nation's poor by engaging in lending and development activities that were provided with only a minimal yet suffi cient return on investment. Just as importantly, CDFIs sought to create and act as a stable institutional structure with an established and committed leadership devoted to muster the limited resources of distressed communities together with the fi nances they could solicit from external conventional and philanthropic sources, to foster the economic improvement of their communities and thereby enhance the economic well-being and life chances of the diverse impoverished populations of the "Other America."
The CDFI movement has elements and beliefs that are both idealistic and pragmatic, hopeful yet concerned with due attention to the fi nancial bottom-line, accepting challenges (sometimes seemingly insurmountable ones) with an expectation that, with hard work and carefully crafted strategies, ultimately, their objectives will succeed. Many of those in leadership positions in CDFIs across the country, helping guide the activities of CDFIs, CDEs, land trusts, and ad hoc coalitions, embody what seem to be contradictions-social justice and adequate return on investment, systemic improvement in the economies of some of our most distressed communities while relying upon many of the ideological tenets embodied in a bastardized version of the Horatio Alger doctrine of self-help, 24 and a hope of indigenous fi nancial institutions (small ones at that) as viable solutions to the near-intractable problems of poor economic performance and social distress. Yet, as David Greenstone, an infl uential early proponent of the American Political Development (APD) movement in American Political Science, and historian Michael Kammen, in his provocative People of Paradox , noted, embracing apparent contradictions is a typical feature of American political and economic movements. 25 Today's CDFI movement was forged from diverse experience (and failure), numerous and not necessarily compatible ideological fonts, and the fusion of religious, progressive convictions in the midst of fi nancial imperatives of an economy where benefi ts fl ow to a stunningly small proportion of the nation's and world's super-rich. 26 The basic mission of CDFIs is, at base, to provide the access to capital and basic fi nancial services, two elements seen as utterly critical to economic well-being, to communities that have been overlooked, if not abandoned, by mainstream fi nancial institutions. These very small fi nancial institutions, against substantial odds, seek to provide loans and investments to underdeveloped areas of the country and the millions of families and individuals that reside in these distressed areas, many of whom are poor, suffer high incident of underemployment and unemployment, and have few prospects of participating in the American economic dream. CDFIs (and CDEs in the NMTC program) attempt, and many times succeed, in making loans in highly distressed areas of the country (urban and rural alike) as they establish themselves into autonomous, viable fi nancial institutions. CDFIs now have a relatively long track record of accumulating equity and of attracting and retaining resources, both public and private, from outside their communities. CDFIs have, over the past 40 years, successfully forged themselves into (albeit small) viable and autonomous fi nancial institutions whose primary mission is to improve the local economy and expand the benefi ts of enhanced economic opportunity to the largely poor and minority residents of these communities.
By 1992, a casual, although oft-repeated, proposal by candidate Bill Clinton spawned interest in the creation of some kind of federal initiative to grapple with the multifaceted problems of economic backwardness, poor housing, underemployment, and, indeed, poverty. Already, at this time, the CDFI industry was, if in its youth, established. There were a few hundred existing and active CDFIs, dozens of CLTs, and several hundred CDCs active in affordable housing and commercial development, business lending as well as venturing into the fi nancing and construction of facilities to deliver social services. The community economic development movement had matured into a network of viable, although many times fragile, institutions that shared a structured and coherent normative belief in their positive mission to improve the lives of the residents of their communities. The CDFI industry indeed had already formed a national trade organization, the precursor to today's Opportunity Finance Network (OFN), to formalize this national network to advance their agenda publicly and target especially philanthropies, religious organizations, and a nascent but growing group of socially conscious investors. Autonomy was a value of such central importance to the CDFI movement and their national organization that in line with this principle, the CDFI movement did not seek the creation of a federal organization to act as a font or conduit of capital resources. Indeed, with Clinton's somewhat opaque proposal to create some kind of federal agency, many in the CDFI movement saw this as a potential threat to mission-driven institutions that CDFIs exemplifi ed. The possibility of yet another top-down federal bureaucracy, even if with its creation it could represent access to the substantial resources of the federal government, was seen as a likely impediment to the CDFI movement. Meanwhile, a coalition of many within the CDFI movement effectively intervened to bring about the creation of the CDFI Fund in the early months of the Clinton administration.
The contemporary CDFI industry is based on normative models of neighborhood empowerment and democratic self-government. These philosophical roots are based in Christian theology and informed as well by the teachings of Gandhi, especially as these beliefs were articulated by Chuck Matthei, who founded and led the Institute for Community Economics for many years, was an advocate of CLTs, and was a founding member of the board for the National Association of Community Loan Funds, the precursor to today's OFN. Matthei's presentations and writings provide an outline of the basic formative principles of the community economic development movement that later matured into a network of community loan funds. Matthei was the original font for some of the central ideas that organized the growing community development movement into the many CDFIs located in urban and rural areas today. Perhaps his most important contribution was the idea that community development is dependent upon creating a community balance sheet where assets are indigenously created and maintained within poor and distressed lowincome, frequently minority, communities. These assets, including land and capital, need to be controlled by institutions-fi nancial and otherwise-rooted in the community that make the fundamental development decisions for the benefi t of the communities they serve. Like King, Matthei was a lifelong follower of the philosophy and activism of Gandhi, practicing not only non-violent protest (he burned his draft card and refused to be drafted in protest against the Vietnam War) but also cultivating a long association with the Catholic Worker Movement, which provided food and shelter to the indigent poor and articulated a critique of the American social system, which was so harmful to the poor. Following Gandhi and his Catholic religious convictions, Matthei came to believe in a vision of the cooperative use of land, democratic programs to control local development, and the right of all families to live in decent, affordable housing. 28 Drawing inspiration from Christian theology and, indeed, citing the institutional importance of churches as sources of positive, progressive development in America's communities, Matthei formulated an argument for community economic development as a solution to many of the fundamental problems routinely facing the poor in America. He emphasized that economic value, land value, and property values are both collective and private simultaneously. Concerning property, this is especially so: while we think of the property system in a market economy largely as private property, in fact property is not held in a vacuum. It is a "bundle of values," the sources of which are both public and private, and we need to recognize it as such. Some of the basic problems of poor communities, he argued, is not that there are few resources, but rather that these resources are neither owned by nor controlled by poor residents who live in the community. A primary source of impoverishment, Matthei argued, was the absentee private ownership of land and most of the physical improvements constructed upon it, especially housing. He emphasized, for instance, that the poor were overwhelmingly renters, indeed tenants, who all too frequently paid exorbitant monthly fees for what was typically poor-quality, if not dilapidated, housing. As non-owners, the poor in fact paid out, over the life of a lease (or many leases), hundreds of thousands of dollars, nearly all of which fl owed outside the community to those individuals and consortia that owned these properties. Matthei argued that perhaps the only way to break this apparently endless cycle of poverty and dependence was to create a system where, residents, poor and more affl uent alike, would own collectively the land and the housing of their communities. This clearly was an alternative mode of economic thought and advocacy: the collective ownership of land would both enable residents to build some modest equity in the property of the trust and escape the wasteful expenditure of rent that merely enriched a distant and unknown owner.
Citing the Christian doctrine of stewardship and adding to this Gandhi's advocacy for trusteeship, Matthei argued for community economic development built upon land trusts. Community land trusts (CLTs) he defi ned as "democratically structured, nonprofi t corporations that own land and make it available…for residential, commercial, agricultural, public service, or other appropriate purposes." Building upon a European tradition where land is only controlled by long-term (frequently 99 years) leases, the local CLT would own land and then, in turn, lease it to individuals and businesses. Individual families and businesses, in turn, can construct or improve buildings on the land and own these physical structures, but the land remains collectively owned. Organized in this fashion, communities will control development, retain equity, albeit collectively, and undermine the fl ow of resources (such as rent) to individuals and businesses that reside outside the community.
In his writings and presentations, Matthei articulated several key and enduring provisions of an equitable and effective community economic development program in contemporary America. As many in the community development movement at the time, Matthei was apprehensive (as indeed was much of the community economic development community) of large, federal programs administered by distance, faceless, and infl exible bureaucracies. Economically distressed and impoverished areas were so, in part, precisely because they were utterly dependent upon external public and private resources that were structurally unresponsive to the needs of urban neighborhoods or rural communities. Such areas were quite unique, with discrete sets of problems and opportunities. It was critical to create local, community-based fi nancial institutions that served the needs of these communities. Additionally, community-based fi nancial institutions, whether they are organized as CDFIs, credit unions, or perhaps another model that fi ts and also serves well the challenges of specifi c distressed communities, must have a constant and renewed source of working capital. Distressed communities need to be endowed with tangible, fungible assets in their "community balance sheet"-namely, resources controlled by the loan fund or other community-based fi nancial institution-that can be prudently invested to improve the local economy and the lives of the residents of these areas. Matthei also established the basic outline of kinds of loans and investments that community-based loan funds should pursue to meaningfully attack poverty and economic distress. First, and following the fruitful example of CDCs, developing affordable housing, especially affordable housing that can be purchased by low-and moderate-income families is critical. Facilitating home ownership acts as a means to evade the spillage of resources to outside the community, as happens with rental dollars, and also serves to allow moderate-income families build equity in the value of their homes. Second, local business development should be encouraged through the use of micro-business lending. As the community development community was emerging from solely a CDC model, Chuck Matthei consistently provided a more expansive vision of the prerequisites of community development. Creating and nurturing an indigenous, responsible local fi nancial institution, a community loan fund preferably, he believed, was critical. Such loan funds can, however, only be effective agents for their neighborhoods if they have, and can control, a "community balance sheet" of assets that they can utilize for lending and investment.
Matthei served not only as a thoughtful normative theorist for the community development movement, but was also active in many roles either in directly creating and nurturing land trusts and community loan fund or in helping create a set of institutions that supported the activities, especially of CDFI loan funds. Throughout the 1980s, Matthei was the Executive Director of the Institute for Community Economics (ICE), which was originally located in Greenfi eld, MA. During this time, the ICE was active in pioneering the community loan fund and CLT models, providing training and technical assistance to individuals and groups interested in forming one or both of these community-based economic development institutions. During this time, the number of trusts and community loan funds increased several fold. Additionally, Matthei, along with others, was instrumental in forming the National Association of Community Development Loan Funds (NACDLF), the national trade organizations of CDFIs now rebranded as the Opportunity Finance Network (OFN). From 1985 to 1990, he served as the founding Chairman of the Association and as founding board member of the Social Investment Forum, an association that advocates socially responsible investment.
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Perhaps even more importantly, Matthei also developed and championed community loan funds as a complement to land trusts as a critical element to facilitate (and locally control) community economic development. One critical issue that the community development movement grappled with during the 1970s and 1980s (when the federal government largely ignored the problems of community economic distress) was the problem of access to capital. Cut off from the fl ow of mainstream banks, insurance companies, and pension funds, low-income, distressed communities in both city and rural settings required, if any meaningful change were to occur, both access to a fl ow of capital resources and the sustenance (and retention) of equity that neighborhood-based institutions could control and invest for the benefi t of the community. Matthei and many others in the movement came upon, and popularized, the idea of a "community balance sheet"-equity resources that were to be controlled by a locally founded community loan fund and invested to achieve the objectives and ends uniquely crafted to fi t the needs and interest of the community, not the profi t motives of banks and other regulated fi nancial institutions. The idea of the loan fund, as it crystallized during this period, was attractive because these small, community-based institutions could, unlike regulated banks and credit unions, take on all manner of institutional frameworks, were fi rmly rooted in the community, and could create, control, and employ the resources of their "community balance sheet" to create the kinds of benefi ts that would best serve their neighborhood. Two especially prominent objectives included, fi rst, micro-loans primarily for business creation and expansion and, second, lending and direct investment to create an adequate supply of decent affordable housing.
Matthei's achievements, even in his short life, were considerable. ICE was established as a permanent asset to the American (and international) community development community. Indeed, during his tenure as head of the ICE, over 100 CLTs in the USA were formed in 23 states. He was successful, as well, in working with students at Williams College and in establishing a community development component to that college's substantial endowment portfolio. He lived to see the creation of over 300 loan funds located across all regions of the country, successfully accumulating from a variety of sources-philanthropies, religious orders, private individuals, and incurring debt from banks and other regulated institutions-and using these resources to make prudent investments in their communities.
The establishment of a primary source (or numerous sources) of funding for this community investment community (primarily loan fundsemerging CDFIs) became especially critical in the early 1980s. The Reagan administration was overtly hostile to any form of community or housing development and, indeed, sought to dramatically restrict federal dollars to the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, which had been a primary lever of federal revenue sharing to cities and counties and was the source, determined by local governments, of resources to a host of community-based initiatives. As the landscape of federal support, and indirectly, state, county, and local city resources, dried up, the emerging community development movement suffered from a profound, potentially fatal, dearth of resources. Fortunately, into this breech, stepped forward perhaps a most unexpected source of capital coupled with a commitment to social justice-Catholic nuns' pension funds. 30 Matthei is important not simply because he was a successful activist for the community economic development movement but also because he so clearly articulated what became (and remain) some of the central tenets of the American community development movement. Indeed, Matthei's thinking, as he presented it in numerous venues across the country for several years, was accepted widely across the industry and explains, in part, the initial response to Bill Clinton's plan to create 100 federally chartered (and therefore subject to a regime of federal regulation) development banks as the solution to economic distress when this proposal transpired. Central to Matthei's analysis of the problems of low-income communities was his contention that the rather modest resources in such communities-the aggregate income of residents in particular-was hardly theirs to control. Rather, all or most of the monetary resources that came into poor or, indeed, many moderate-income neighborhoods systematically fl owed out again and largely into the hands of absentee landlords. In economically distressed communities, nearly all the residents were renters, paying all too frequently far too much of their income on rent on properties that were almost universally inadequate or substandard in some way. With no reasonable alternative, poor families pay out a high proportion of their income on rent and they do so to owners of the properties who reside elsewhere and reinvest little in the way of upkeep or improvements to these rental properties.
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External economic institutions and business, especially fi nancial institutions, do not provide solutions to the problems of low-income communities; indeed, they are frequently contributors to this problem. A critical element of a meaningful and consequential economic development strategy, then, was to create an indigenous, democratically accountable fi nancial institution-a community loan fund, preferably-that would aggregate resources from a variety of sources, including philanthropies, religious institutions, and government, and use this now locally controlled capital to make investments within the neighborhood. In other words, significant improvement in the community depended upon a community-based fi nancial institution that represented and acted for the interests of those living in the community; this community loan fund must be able to accumulate capital resources-equity-that the loan fund and the community control autonomously. Once this institutional base is established and with equity available, the most important program a CDFI should tackle is housing problems endemic to lower-income communities. Especially important is the need to create quality, affordable housing and to take all steps necessary to encourage home ownership by low-and moderateincome families. Doing so would tangibly break the cycle of the rental payments of low-income residents fl owing from the community into the coffers of absentee landlords. 32 Additionally, and this was Chuck Matthei's passion, the community loan fund could act as the conduit to purchase or otherwise assemble land in neighborhoods into CLTs, which, in his framework, would assure that a community could control its economic fate over the long run. The kind of community-controlled land trust Matthei advocated was "…a democratically structured not-for-profi t corporation, with an open membership, created to hold land for the benefi t of the community and of individuals within the community."
33 While the ownership of land in trusts in perpetuity was crucial for poor, moderate-income, and working-class communities alike to control economic development within boundaries, Matthei did not advocate the collective ownership of properties that already resided upon the land or would be constructed in the future (including both housing and non-residential structures). Such structures (especially housing), Matthei believed and noted in all of his publications, should be privately held and maintained and, additionally, the individuals and families that owned and made improvements of these buildings, that conducted a business or resided in these structures, ought to accrue equity through their ownership and stewardship of these businesses or homes. 34 An ICE paper summarized Matthei's point: "Homeownership in a CLT is a simple concept. The buyer owns the home, the community retains the land. If the homeowner decides to sell, he or she leaves with a share of the equity while the community retains an affordable house." A CLT homeowner, typically a family that could never have hoped to own property, enjoys all the benefi ts of home ownership in America: they receive the tax deduction for interest payments on a mortgage; they enjoy long-term security and a share of the equity (albeit modestly) that accumulates in the property. 35 After the perceived failures of the Great Society's OEO initiatives, and the hostile environment for community-based programs in the Nixon administration (and intensifi ed later under the Reagan administration), there was a shift toward creating equity on a community balance sheet as the basis for community economic development. The activities of the ICE in Springfi eld, MA, and Chuck Matthei were especially important in this effort. Mark Pinsky, the Executive Director of the OFN, the national trade association of CDFIs, refers to Matthei as the industry's "Johnny Appleseed" who hitchhiked around the country preaching the gospel of locally controlled assets in a "community balance sheet" as the true mantra of the emerging CDFI industry.
THE CLINTON INITIATIVE
However, a dramatic potential change to the community development movement changed with a single event-the visit by candidate Bill Clinton to ShoreBank on the south side of Chicago in the summer of 1992. Clinton was very impressed by the development activities of ShoreBank, a community development bank that, by the time of Clinton's visit, had successfully provided fi nancial services and loans, especially mortgages, to the South Shore neighborhood in Chicago. ShoreBank was unique on many fronts. Illinois, at that time, had banking laws that permitted only "unit" banks-namely, banks that had but one central offi ce and no branches. Unlike other community banks in Chicago that had served allwhite neighborhoods (South Shore between the 1950 and 1970 censuses had changed from a nearly all-white, Jewish community to one that was almost entirely African-American), ShoreBank did not close down their headquarters within the city of Chicago and relocate to a suburban site, as had so many other community banks in the Chicago metropolitan area. While this had been threatened, a group of social activist investors led by Ronald Grzywinski purchased the bank with the conscious intent of remaining in this largely African-American community and providing the full range of fi nancial services, especially offering mortgages, to a now largely all-black consumer base. And, for a decade, against the expectations of many in the Chicago business community and apparently state regulators as well, ShoreBank had negotiated successfully the diffi cult path of both providing lending and fi nancial services to the racially changing South Shore neighborhood and remaining fi nancially viable and sound by Illinois regulatory standards. 37 Bluntly, ShoreBank was a bank that had not abandoned the American black community, engaged in good community development work, and was, nonetheless, fi nancially successful. 38 Clinton was so impressed that he immediately began to include in his campaign stump speech advocacy of a community development program that was premised on a proposal to create 100 community banks, modeled upon ShoreBank, as a key element in community revitalization for the nation.
After his visit to ShoreBank and being quickly versed in the unique and innovative activities of this community bank located in the South Shore community of Chicago in August 1992, candidate Bill Clinton soon thereafter proposed that ShoreBank was a model for community development throughout the country. He proposed, and repeated several times in stump speeches during the fall campaign, that his administration would propose to Congress that the federal government charter a system of 100 community banks modeled on the ShoreBank experiment. Clinton was apparently only vaguely aware that ShoreBank was, in fact, not only unusual among regulated banks (in this case a state chartered bank) but also an outlier among the already well-established CDFI industry. Then, as now, regulated banks and credit unions represented a distinct minority among the few hundred CDFIs already active in the early 1990s and, in fact, did not represent, in terms of institutional structure or in the provision of fi nancial services, the emerging CDFI industry. ShoreBank, just as the handful of other community banks across the county, or, indeed, the many low-income and community-focused credit unions were constrained by the regulatory systems in which they were 37 Judith D. Feins, Urban Housing Disinvestment and Neighborhood Decline: A Study of Public Policy Outcomes (Chicago: University of Chicago Ph.D. diss., 1977). Feins' dissertation on urban disinvestment and the programmatic space it provided to alternative fi nancial institutions (such as CDFIs) was an analysis that primarily used ShoreBank as its case study. 38 Richard P. Taub, Community Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1988), 101-111.
embedded. Community banks and the minority of credit unions did not have the freedom and autonomy that hundreds of community loan funds, land trusts and, CDCs, as unregulated fi nancial and development institutions, enjoyed.
Long before Presidential candidate Bill Clinton was introduced to, and apparently became smitten by, the unique community bank on Chicago's South Side, ShoreBank, in mid-1992, CDFIs had already created their identity as an identifi able industry with a consistent vision, a clear institutional structure (primarily as over 200 non-profi t unregulated loan funds) with established and ongoing relationships between philanthropic and mainstream fi nancial institutions, and a national trade organization that represented the interests of the burgeoning CDFI movement.
Clinton's proposed community banking development was an initiative to create a new system of 100 community banks. The requirements of implementing this system were considerable, a fact that quickly became clear to policy-makers in the new administration as well as to knowledgeable members of Congress. The requirements to create an entire new, additional layer in the national banking system were considerable. While some (perhaps even a plurality) of the already existing banks could have been designated as "community development banks" in this new system, signifi cant incentives would have to have been offered to already existing fi nancial institutions, corporations, philanthropies, and other private entities to create from entirely new cloth, and infuse with the necessary capital, these development banks. Notably, these newly designated or created banks would have to be structured to serve communities and populations across the county that had, because of perceived risk and inadequate returns on investment, previously been underserved by conventional banking and other fi nancial institutions from the time of the severe banking crises that plagued the country since the onset of the Great Depression. These were areas such as innumerable rural areas that had experienced widespread bank failures from 1920 to 1933 until the stabilization of the entire banking industry in the early years of the New Deal (a period when about 15,000 banks failed) as well as economically declining areas largely in central cities where unit banks (such as Illinois and many other Midwestern and Southern states) had relocated from inner-city neighborhoods to suburban communities in the same metropolitan areas. To do so, in other words, would require providing inducements strongly contrary to the spatial pattern of fi nancial market failures, some of which were the result solely of private market factors and others the consequence of the implementation of federal regulation (initiated in New Deal policies and sustained in federal and state banking regulatory policy for the next 60 years, albeit in progressively diminished content) to assure the safety and soundness of fi nancial institution investments. Against this backdrop, it is diffi cult to imagine the kinds and substance of incentives that would bring the conventional banking and fi nancial industry to redesignate or create new banking entities to serve these purposes.
Furthermore, the creation of a national system of community banks would have mandated as well a host of signifi cant changes in federal (and state) banking legislation, in addition to signifi cant modifi cations to the numerous, and historically entrenched, regulatory systems that oversee the American banking system. Banks, thrifts, credit unions, pension systems, and insurance companies (the heart of the American fi nancial system) are creatures of, and subject to, the regulatory systems of the Federal Reserve System, the Offi ce of the Comptroller, the Federal Deposit Insurance System, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance System, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the National Credit Union Administration, as well as the many state-level banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and credit union regulatory agencies that supervise these fi nancial institutions. Each sector of the American fi nancial system-especially banks, insurance companies, and thrifts-is a member of, and is represented by, national trade associations, which employ a small army of lobbyists who zealously guard the perquisites, programmatic advantages, and tax incentives that each has accumulated since the advent of a national system of banking and regulation that began during the Civil War and changed (and most frequently expanded) in response to subsequent national fi nancial crises. In other words, initiating the necessary changes to the American fi nancial system is a daunting task at any time, but it is an especially diffi cult one in times other than those of severe crises
To create an entirely new system of community banks would have required strong and sustained commitment on the part of the new administration and the expending of signifi cant political capital to bring about this system of community banks. Indeed, it is important to recall that there were other pressing policy priorities that the new President had proposed, not the least of which was the attempt to dramatically reform the nation's health-care insurance system. While the Clinton administration's healthcare program ultimately met with defeat, this initiative, nonetheless, represented the major policy program of the administration during its fi rst term. Simply put, neither the proposal for a community banking system nor many other domestic policies absorbed the attention of the President or members of his administration. Not only would any plan to create a system of community banks require this kind of commitment from the administration, but also they would have had to acquire the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of banking and thrift national trade associations and their lobbyists to move this proposal forward. And bluntly, this was not forthcoming from the nation's fi nancial industry.
Adopting an already existing model (the CDFI industry), especially since it was very small and could only, with the most paranoid imagination of banking interests, ever become a meaningful competitor to the nation's banks, thrifts, and, indeed, credit unions was, in policy terms, a manageable task. Founding a new agency with a modest budget to support an already existing industry was an acceptable and ready path to follow. This is, in fact, what occurred. Bluntly, no matter how impressed Bill Clinton was with the activities of ShoreBank, and then his wish to amplify this literally a hundred times over, this proposal stood little chance of success.
After Bill Clinton won the election in 1992, his advocacy for this system of a hundred community development banks became not an idle campaign promise but one of many legislative initiatives that he articulated in the planning for his new administration. The advocacy for a system of community development banks advanced within the transition team as it made plans for the fi rst years of the new Clinton administration. Importantly, many members of this emerging community economic development group (Martin Trimble as the prime mover, Mark Pinsky, and others) saw the Clinton initiative, while potentially promising, equally as a threat to the existing CDFI industry. One lesson many in the movement had learned from the multifaceted community-based programs of the Great Society's War on Poverty was that direct federal involvement in community development was fraught with, at best, diffi culties and, at worse, abject failure. The large-scale and illconceived federal housing programs for low-and moderate-income families included in the Fair Housing Act of 1968 were an all-too-painful case in point. The ownership and rental subsidy programs of this Act (Sections 235 and 236) relied entirely on profi t-making incentives to private lenders, real estate developers, and realtors to bring about the dramatic (indeed clearly overstated) housing objectives of the waning Johnson administration. Coupled to this was the dramatic change in the role of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in implementing mortgage insurance. By the late 1960s, the FHA had had some three decades of consistent, staid, and fi scally conservative experience in implementing the nation's mortgage insurance program. The underwriting principles and the FHA's administering of mortgage insurance were critical in, as sociologist Kevin Fox Gotham aptly termed, "racializing" the American real estate system. 39 In its fi rst 30 years, the FHA had systematically refused to insure a mortgage if there were any possibility that the home would be occupied, as owner or renter, by a nonwhite. In addition to being indefensibly discriminatory, the FHA's actions also had dramatic, and adverse, effects on the long-term ability of AfricanAmerican and Latinos in accumulating wealth. 40 The Fair Housing Act, in part, was seen by many at the time as reparation of the FHA's highly discriminatory past. The Act not only provided an appropriation to the FHA to pay for the mortgage and rental subsidy programs in the legislation (a sharp departure from previous practice), but also Congress instructed the FHA to signifi cantly relax its safety and soundness rules in insuring mortgages or guarantying rents. This permitted individuals and families that previously would have been denied mortgage insurance to be eligible for these federal subsidized insurance programs. With the exclusive reliance on private profi t-seeking actors (with minimal public regulatory supervision) to fulfi ll the objectives of these programs, these programs quickly deteriorated into widespread scandal and failure. In just 3-4 years, the scandal, centered at the newly formed Department of Housing and Urban Development, summed to losses to the federal government of billions of dollars and led, as well, to numerous criminal prosecutions. 41 With these vivid examples of policy failure and, worse, fi nancial fraud resulting from the Great Society's community development programs in general and the housing subsidy programs included in the Fair Housing Act in particular, it is little surprise that, when a proposal for yet another federal agency community economic development, albeit one that would pointedly serve America's distressed communities, many in the emerging CDFI industry were exceedingly apprehensive of such a proposal. Indeed, Mark Pinsky reports that there were many in the community development movement at the time who were so concerned about the specifi cs of President-elect Clinton's plan that they preferred that no new agency be created as compared with one where the interests and needs of CDFIs were not served. 42 Perhaps most importantly, activists in the community development movement believed Clinton's proposal for a hundred community development banks based on the ShoreBank model to be, at best, misguided and, at worse, a threat to the viability of their vision of community development based upon independent, albeit small, loan funds. In an attempt to shift the policy agenda of the incoming Clinton administration, the nascent community development movement articulated an alternative vision (one based on unregulated CDFI loan funds and not on community banks). This took the form of a position paper written by Mark Pinsky, who had been retained as a consultant to CDFI Coalition, the national trade organization of CDFIs at the time. Pinsky, Martin Trimble, and others arranged to meet with members of the Clinton transition team to present the contents of their policy statement. On the day of this appointment, they waited over 10 hours for their planned meeting with the Clinton transition team only to be informed, by an intern who was assisting the transition effort, that the meeting was canceled. Pinsky nonetheless gave the intern a copy of his paper and managed to arrange a breakfast meeting the next day. While this meeting did take place and some discussion of the position paper occurred, no one in the CDFI Coalition had a direct meeting with members of the new President's transition team. While the position paper had been delivered, Tremble, Pinsky and the others left Washington not knowing whether or not their views had, in fact, been conveyed to the Clinton transition team. Some period of silence followed, leading those in the Coalition to conclude that their efforts had been for naught. Then, early in the new administration, President Clinton and others in his administration began using the language and concepts that had been articulated in the "Principles" paper that Pinsky had written. As soon as 42 Mark Pinsky's interview June 11, 2015. this shift in language occurred (and most importantly the proposal for a 100 development banks disappeared from the policy discourse), the basis of the legislative process was henceforth organized along the vision articulated by the Coalition's position paper. As the legislation that proposed a CDFI agency was drafted, and subsequent hearing in Congress conducted, it was the vision the Coalition had presented that formed the basis of the legislation, and it was practitioners and activists in the burgeoning CDFI industry who testifi ed before Congressional committees.
By providing a clear, well-argued, and articulate position, the Coalition set the agenda in a policy vacuum in a way they had not anticipated. Namely, while candidate and then President-elect Bill Clinton repeated a rhetorical version of his community development revitalization plan, it soon became evident that, while this issue was of paramount importance to the nowadolescent CDFI movement, community development was in fact a minor component of the new President's domestic agenda. Relegated to a subordinate domestic issue within the new administration, the Coalition had an opportunity, which they exploited, to advance the Coalition's community development agenda. This void was fi lled by a position paper the Coalition issued in late January 1993, written for the CDFI Coalition by Mark Pinsky. This paper, entitled "Principles of Community Development Lending & Proposals for Key Federal Support," set out an aggressive vision on how the federal government should support community economic development by nurturing and fi nancially supporting CDFIs as the primary means to improve the housing stock and economic base, and to provide tangible benefi ts to residents of economically distressed communities. 43 Underlying the principles was the quietly radical idea that the federal government could appropriately support CDFIs, which specialize in leveraging conventional capital into communities, rather than concentrating on project-based support. Pinsky's paper provided a compelling argument for the CDFI model as the basis of federal legislation. Subtly, but consistently, it questioned the appropriateness of creating numerous regulated institutions-that is, banks and perhaps credit unions-as the sole or primary means of implementing a community development program. Instead, the Coalition emphasized the need to develop and nurture community-based loan funds as the primary means to promote a community development strategy that would yield long-lasting and meaningful results. Indeed, the Coalition emphasized repeatedly that there was an already existing network of community economic development institutions (a small percentage of which were regulated banks and credit unions) that had a successful, if modest, track record of notable achievements. The Coalition proposed forming a federal policy building upon the network of diverse, locally based fi nancial institutions that the CDFI industry had already created. They argued that while the core problem facing distressed communities-urban, rural, and in Native reservations-was the lack of resources in these poor areas of the country. An additional problem was the absence of community controlled assets-equity held by responsive and accountable local fi nancial institutions that would be invested in, and for the benefi t, of the community. The proper role of the federal government community economic development policy, the Coalition argued, was to foster the means by which unrestricted capital would constantly fl ow to CDFIs and allow them to continue to make appropriate loans and investments that they believed would best serve their communities.
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The Coalition's position paper offered two basic reasons why the CDFI industry was uniquely qualifi ed to play a leading role in a federal community development program. First, the CDFI industry had already accumulated a successful track record of fostering community development and growth in distressed communities by offering affordable credit to good borrowers (businesses and families) that have been overlooked by traditional underwriting methods. Second, CDFIs have developed, in part, effective lending programs because they are already rooted in the communities they serve and attuned to the assets, liabilities, and opporunities of these areas. CDFIs had established themselves as diverse organizations that had crafted investment and lending strategies customized to fi t the unique needs of the communities in which they are located and which they already served. CDFIs represent an already existing network of community-based fi nancial institutions that serve the public interest in numerous ways. They have developed methods to responsibly offer credit to those with limited economic means, to those whose credit needs are not otherwise being met by the nation's mainstream fi nancial institutions. CDFIs spur community-wide economic and social development in distressed areas of the country. CDFIs as well provide the technical assistance to borrowers-businesses and individuals alike-to ensure the success of their loans, enabling individual borrowers to achieve self-suffi ciency. 44 Ibid.
Finally, CDFIs are committed to their "mission" solely, making loans and investments for community development purposes. 45 The paper continued to argue the primacy of a need, emphasized for years by Chuck Matthei, to create and sustain assets in a "community balance sheet" for the nation's economically distressed and impoverished communities. Among the factors that will be critical to the success of a long-term effort to build a public purpose community fi nancial system are: (1) building a base of equity that CDFIs or other community development entities have as a base to make investments; (2) access to long-term, low-cost capital; (3) public sector grants to support borrower technical assistance services and new credit product development ventures; (4) a strategy for human capital development in CDFIs or other community development organizations; and (5) continued access by CDFIs to the array of federal housing, business, and social services development programs.
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This position paper ended with recommendations that clearly served the interests of CDFIs and low-income credit unions at the expense of regulated fi nancial institutions, especially banks, as the vehicles best suited to engage the needs of low-income, economically distressed communities across the USA. The Coalition noted subtly that conventional fi nancial institutions, particularly banks, had largely abandoned lower-income and minority communities and, consequently, were institutions that were inappropriately constituted to deal with the problems of America's distressed areas. While regulated banks represented part of the solution to the economic backwaters of the country, banks could only represent but a portion of the solution. The credit needs of poor communities, the paper stressed, were diverse, and as such, a range of fi nancial institutions (some banks, some credit unions, but also unregulated community loan funds, collectively) would best serve the needs of distressed and impoverished areas in both urban and rural settings. Furthermore, the Coalition stressed that a range of investment opportunities existed in lesser-developed areas of the country and, pointedly, not only were business loans needed to improve the local economy and employment opportunities of distressed areas, but lending activities focused on the development of affordable housing (an investment type almost alien to banks in the USA) were also of critical importance. While banks and other federally and state-regulated fi nancial institutions could assist in providing fi nancing and services to low-income, economically distressed communities across the country, it was locally based loan funds that had already developed a long-term record in providing these services to low-income, distressed, and minority communities in America that would play a dominant role in a successful community development strategy. CDFIs and low-income credit unions could not only largely provide these services to the nation's distressed areas, but also productively serve as catalysts for mainstream fi nancial institutions to fi nd new markets in what had been fi nancially underserved communities in the past. 47 The next opportunity for the CDFI Coalition to make the case for federal legislation to adopt the already existing CDFI mission-driven model of community economic development (a model largely based on non-profi t and unregulated loan funds) presented itself when the Senate Banking Committee scheduled a hearing for February 3, 1993, and invited several Coalition representatives to testify. Even before the hearing began, the Coalition worked with the Committee's staff, arranging for three key Senate Banking Committee staff members to travel to Camden, NJ; Philadelphia, and New York City in January 1993 to meet with CDFIs operating in these areas as well as with a selection of borrowers from these CDFIs. This fi eld trip for these Senate staffers was so successful that one participant described the experience in these words: "When you get people from DC into these communities, they get our religion and become our best supporters." 48 While there remained two distinctly different approaches to the establishment of a new community economic development policy-one based on endorsing the already existing CDFI movement and another premised upon the establishment, as Clinton had repeatedly expressed in his campaign speeches, of 100 community development banks ostensibly modeled on the ShoreBank experience-from this point on, only the former option remained viable for federal policy-makers. At the time, Hyman Minsky, a well-known and distinguished economist, and several coauthors, in a policy brief published by the Jerome Levy Institute, assessed the ability of the American banking system to serve the needs of underdeveloped 47 Ibid., 6-11. 48 communities in the country. Their analysis led them to become strong advocates for the national system of community banks that President Clinton had initially proposed. They noted that there were six distinct banking functions required in any community to facilitate economic development, encourage business development and employment, and assure the accumulation of wealth within any community. These were (1) the provision of a payment system for check cashing and clearing and credit and debit cards; (2) a system to secure deposits for savings; (3) the provision of household fi nancing for housing and consumer debts; (4) commercial banking services for loans, payroll services, and student loans; (5) investment banking services; and fi nally, (6) provision of a system of asset management and fi nancial advice to households. Citing reasons initially articulated by George Akerlof nearly 25 years before, Hyman and his associates argued that the mainstream banking industry of the USA was illprepared to provide this full range of necessary fi nancial services to poor communities across America. They provided a strong argument for the creation of a Federal Bank for Community Development Banks (FBCDB), where the FBCDB would simultaneously act as a "clearing bank, the central bank, the correspondent bank, the link with fi nancial markets, [and] the supervising authority for the community development banks." 49 What Minsky and his associates had overlooked (they were, in all likelihood, unaware of the existence and activities of CDFIs) was that there was an already existing system of several hundred CDFIs providing many of the critical services of a viable fi nancial system that they had described to poor and economically distressed communities. They neglected as well the fact that the creation of an FBCDB required substantial changes in the entire fabric of American banking legislation, in addition to what many in Congress believed to be an insubstantial and unending increase in federal budgetary expenditure to bring such a system into existence. These facts were not, however, lost on the Senators conducting hearings on the proposed CDFI legislation in July and September 1993 nor on many of the witnesses who testifi ed. Indeed, an odd coalition of Senators on the committee, obviously pursuing a host of varying political agendas, expressed misgivings about the creation of what was portrayed as an entirely new arm of the federal banking system. By the time these hearings were held, the administration had largely abandoned their initial proposal to create a system of community development banks to one which created a single federal agency, a CDFI Fund, to provide resources to the system of CDFIs (especially community loan funds) that already provided lending and fi nancial services to low-income communities across the country.
Both Republican and Democratic Senators, in these hearings, emphatically did not endorse the creation of what Minsky and his associates had advocated, an FBCDB, to provide needed fi nancial services to America's underserved communities. Rather, many senators expressed a preference to support the existing system of CDFIs, and possibly additional comparable fi nancial institutions, which had already established successful programs to provide needed lending and fi nancial services to communities that had been bypassed by the mainstream banking industry.
Bobby Rush (a Democrat from Illinois), a member of the House, in his testimony before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, summarized the prevailing sentiment of many knowledgeable policy-makers on the then contemporary community economic development movement:
Community Development Financial Institutions across the country, which are innovative entities comprised of individuals who know fi rst-hand what steps to take to improve their communities will now be able to better obtain the economic resources with which to do so. 50 The creation of a CDFI Fund, Congressman Rush continued, will enable this already existing network of CDFIs the capital they require to provide to continue to make loans and investments to low-income distressed communities.
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(a Democrat from New Jersey), in his statement, also spoke approvingly of using the already existing network of CDFIs as the basis of the federal government's community economic development policy:
I am especially pleased that the President saw fi t to target a variety of Community Development Financial Institutions with his proposal-community development banks, credit unions, revolving loan funds, microloan funds, and community development corporations are all eligible for assistance. This means that the fund established by this legislation will be fl exible enough to support the institutions that individual communities have already developed to respond to their unique credit needs, needs that are not being met and have not being met by the private banking sector, and provide resources to them.
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Representatives from the CDFI industry repeatedly emphasized, in their testimony, that the CDFI industry composed of hundreds of community loan funds, low-income credit unions, CDCs, and CLTs, located in all regions of the country had, with little or no support from the federal government, over the two decades provided lending and development services to the nation's poor communities. Paul Grogan of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), a large, national CDFI founded and supported by the Ford Foundation, then barely 15 years old, touted the many successes that not only LISC but also many other CDFIs had had in promoting responsible lending and community economic development throughout the country. Grogan added: "[T]his bill is overdue recognition of the developing infrastructure of nonstandard lenders for profi t and non-profi t lenders that have grown up around the country and representing a developing infrastructure technology and talent that do just this [community economic development]." His organization, he emphasized, has raised over a billion dollars from a variety of investors and has "put that money out in loans and equity investments to grass roots organizations doing housing and economic development in distressed urban communities." 54 Jeremy Nowak, head of a large CDFI with headquarters in Philadelphia, succinctly summarized the CDFI industry's contributions across the USA. The CDFI model of community development and lending to businesses and individuals in economically distressed communities "is a well fi eld tested endeavor. We've got 15 to 20 years experience now, quite frankly…with respect to what works and what doesn't work." The CDFI model, he continued, "integrates social values and sound business practices and it views low-income neighborhoods, not only as places of need, [but also] as places of capacity, power, and potential." 55 Finally, representatives from the Clinton administration, Lloyd Bentson, Secretary of the Treasury, most prominently, testifi ed in support of the legislation. Benston emphasized, as many others already had, that, while far too many communities in the USA lack adequate access to capital, CDFIs have for some time successfully fi lled in this gap:
In short, some people, businesses, and communities face what amounts to a fi nancial services vacuum, and we ought to address it. Fortunately, a number of specialized Community Development Financial Institutions have labored long and hard, and often alone, to restore hope and economic opportunity to those without access to more traditional mainstream fi nancial institutions.
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Senator Dodd, in his prepared statement, summarized succinctly the gist of the matter:
Most important, instead of creating a brand new Federal bureaucracy, the administration's proposal builds on existing private-sector efforts. Community development loan funds, microenterprise funds, community development corporations, and other community development agencies have proven records of success in communities in Connecticut and across the country. The administration's proposal seeks to further these initiatives, instead of starting up a series of Government-operated institutions from scratch. 57 There were, in other words, little real differences expressed in these hearings either by the Senators or by the witnesses, many from the CDFI industry, concerning the bill that established the CDFI Fund. No testimony, even from the administration, supported the creation of an entirely new community banking system, as had been frequently verbalized earlier by candidate Bill Clinton. Rather, across the aisle, there was sentiment to both support this new federal initiative and do so by the creation of an agency within the Department of the Treasury (the CDFI Fund) empower this agency to fund and support the already existing system of small CDFIs. The proposal to create a new system, an FBCDB, while 55 Senate Committee on Banking, "Hearings,"138. 56 Senate Committee on Banking, "Hearings," 18. 57 Senate Committee on Banking, "Hearings," 47. apparently promising, was implicitly rejected in favor of providing support and resources from a new federal agency to an already functioning system of diverse community development entities that had defi ned their primary function as "mission driven"-namely, to act in the interest of social, economic, and indeed, racial justice while, nonetheless, operating according to the dictates of commercial and fi nancial, private marketbased fi duciary responsibility, albeit subsidized by philanthropies and the public sector alike. Charles Riegle (a Democrat from Michigan), sponsor of the bill that created the CDFI Fund, reminded the committee that it had taken 20 years to create and nurture a community bank such as South Shore Bank. 58 In the end, Congress eschewed the prospect of creating a new system of a 100 or more community development banks in ShoreBank's image and instead adopted a policy of supporting the activities of the system of CDFIs that already had two or more decades of experience in productively and responsively engaging in community development lending and related activities.
While many in the CDFI industry feared that Bill Clinton's oft-repeated pledge to create a new system of some 100 or more community development banks throughout the country might lead to the demise of their vision of community development, such did not come to pass. Indeed, the administration and certainly most members of Congress came to see that the informal, small, and unorthodox system of unregulated community loan funds, CDCs, land trusts as well as a distinct minority of banks and credit unions was a viable and productive fi nancial system that already provided a host of lending and fi nancial services to the nation's poor and distressed communities. Congress passed the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (Public Law No. 103-325) by wide margins and with support from both Democrats and Republicans. The CDFI Fund was created with the explicit intent of "promot[ing] economic revitalization and community development through an investment and improvement program for community development institutions" (Title 4). The legislation created the CDFI Fund and gave funding to provide grants and loans primarily to loan funds and those few banks and thrifts that were already providing community development services. The Act "[a]uthorizes the Fund to provide capitalization assistance to enhance the liquidity of community development fi nancial institutions" (Section 109). And clearly aware that there was an array of fi nancial regulatory systems among the many states, the Act was also to "express … the sense of Congress" that "the States should: (1) establish uniform laws for licensing and regulating non-depository institution businesses which engage in currency transactions, [and] (2) provide suffi cient resources for regulatory enforcement" (Section 407).
In the legislation establishing the CDFI Fund, the agency was charged with certifying indigenous fi nancial institutions as viable fi nancial institutions that provided lending and fi nancial services to their service areas and, importantly, with providing grants and loans to these certifi ed CDFIs to increase their capacities to provide services to these distressed communities. Later, the CDFI Fund was also charged with administering the NMTC program.
